Frito-Lay and/or Transcontinental Insurance Company v. Utah Labor Commission and Amy C. Clausing : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2006
Frito-Lay and/or Transcontinental Insurance
Company v. Utah Labor Commission and Amy C.
Clausing : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Theodore E. Kanell, John H. Romney; Plant, Christensen and Kanell; Attorneys for Appellant/
Petitioner.
K. Dawn Atkin; Atkin and Associates; Attorneys for Appellee/Respondent.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Frito Lay v. Utah Labor Commission, Clausing, No. 20061053 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6973
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRITO-LAY and/or * REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
TRANSCONTINENTAL * 




vs. * Appeal No. 20061053-CA 
* 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION and * Agency Decision No. 2003892 
AMY C. CLAUSING * 
* 
Appellees, 
APPEAL FROM ORDER OF THE JUDGE SESSION'S FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER OF SEPTEMBER 23, 2005, AND THE 
ORDER DISMISSING RESPONDENT'S RULE 60(B) MOTION ENTERED BY THE 
APPEALS BOARD OF THE UTAH LABOR COMMISSION ON OCTOBER 23, 2006. 
K. Dawn Atkin Theodore E. Kanell (1768) 
Atkin & Associates John H. Romney (9160) 
1111 Brickyard Road, Suite 206 PLANT CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellees Attorneys for Appellants 
UTAH A n m 
MAT 1 0 200? 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRITO-LAY and/or * REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
TRANSCONTINENTAL * 




vs. * Appeal No. 20061053-CA 
* 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION and * Agency Decision No. 2003892 
AMY C. CLAUSING * 
Appellees, 
APPEAL FROM ORDER OF THE JUDGE SESSION'S FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER OF SEPTEMBER 23, 2005, AND THE 
ORDER DISMISSING RESPONDENT'S RULE 60(B) MOTION ENTERED BY THE 
APPEALS BOARD OF THE UTAH LABOR COMMISSION ON OCTOBER 23, 2006. 
K. Dawn Atkin 
Atkin & Associates 
1111 Brickyard Road, Suite 206 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Theodore E. Kanell (1768) 
John H.Romney (9160) 
PLANT CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellees Attorneys for Appellants 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ARGUMENT 1 
I. APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR RELIEF WAS REQUIRED UNDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES 1 
A. The September 2005 Order was Correct When Issued 2 
i. Clausing's interpretation was meritless in light of 
the undisputed facts of the case 3 
ii. Appellant's interpretation was the only 
reasonable interpretation 3 
iii. An incorrect interpretation does not make a 
proper order improper 4 
B. The Motion for Review Was Taken From the March 17, 2006 Order. 4 
i. The Motion for Review was timely filed, even if taken from the 
September 2005 Order 6 
C. The Principles of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Are Applicable in Administrative Proceedings 8 
II. CLAUSING'S ARGUMENT IS DEFEATED BY HER CONCESSIONS. . 10 
A. The Discovery of a Dispute Regarding the Meaning of the September 
2005 Order Constitutes a "Subsequently Discovered Fact" 11 
B. The Discovery of a Dispute and the Entry of the March 17, 2006 Order 
Both Constitute a "Significant Change or Development." 11 
C. There Is Not Only Abundant "Proof," but Also Admissions of the 
"Previous Award's Inadequacy." 12 
D. The Admitted Existence of a "Significant Judicial Error" Authorized 
the Labor Commission to Reverse the ALJ. The Labor Commission 
Erred in Holding Otherwise 12 
III. THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AS PRESENTED BY APPELLANT ARE 
PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT AND SHOULD NOT BE LIMITED. 13 
A. The Motion for Review Properly Preserved the Issues on Appeal. . 1 3 
B. The Motion for Relief Should Be Considered According to its Content, 
Not its Title 13 
C. Even If the Issues on Appeal Were Limited, the Labor Commission 
Should Still Be Reversed 15 
i. The Labor Commission erred in not addressing, much less 
finding excusable neglect. 15 
- l -
ii. The Labor Commission erred in not finding that the TTD claims 
had been satisfied 16 
iii. The Labor Commission erred in not reversing the ALJ for other 
reasons justifying relief 17 
iv. The Labor Commission erred in not addressing the content of 
the Motion for Review 18 
IV. CLAUSING'S ADMISSION OF ADDITIONAL ERROR IN THE ORDER 
FURTHER JUSTIFIES REVERSAL OF THE LABOR COMMISSION . 1 9 
A. Clausing Is Not Entitled to Either TTD or Temporary Partial 
Disability 19 
B. Clausing's Claims to Temporary Partial Disability Compensation Has 
Been Waived 20 
V. THE APPELLANT DID NOT FAIL TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE 21 
CONCLUSION 21 
-ii-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Airkem Intermountain v. Parker. 513 P.2d 429 (Utah 1973) 8 
Armstrong Rubber v. Bastian. 657 P.2d 1346, 1348 (Utah 1983) 14 
Bowen Trucking v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 559 P.2d 954, 956 (Utah 1997) 10 
Career Serv. Review Bd. v. Utah Dep't of CoiTection. 942 P.2d 933, 946 (Utah 1977) 
(emphasis added) 10,22 
Howard v. Howard. 356 P.2d 275 (Utah 1960) 14 
Interstate Excavating v. Agla Dev. Corp.. 611 P.2d 369, 372 (Utah 1980) 15 
Kennecott Corp.. v. State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1991) 8 
Laub v. South Central Utah Tel. Ass'n.. 657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982) 17 
Lund v. Brown. 11 P.3d 277 (Utah 2000) 16 
Mini Spas Inc.. v. Ind. Comm'n. 733 P.2d 130 (Utah 1987) 8 
Nielson v. Gurlev. 888 P.2d 130 (Utah App. 1994) 6, 7 
Paulsen v. The Industrial Commission. 770 P.2d 125 (Utah 1989) 10, 12, 13 
Pilcher v. State Department of Social Services. 663 P.2d 450 (Utah 1983) 5, 9 
State v. Leatherburv. 65 P.3d 1180 (Utah 2003) 6 
State Tax Comm'n v. Iverson. 782 P.2d 519, 527-28 (Utah 1989) 9 
-in-
ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR RELIEF WAS REQUIRED UNDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES. 
Appellee, Clausing's, main argument is that the statutes do not authorize the 
Appellant's initial motion ("motion for relief) filed with the ALJ after Clausing's 
interpretation of the September 23,2005 Order became known on December 1,2005. (Brief 
of Appellee, Point I). Clausing's main argument is not supported by the evidence in this 
case, and should therefore be rejected. Under the circumstances and facts of this case, the 
filing of Appellant's motion for relief from Clausing's interpretation of the September 2005 
Order was not only authorized, but in a practical sense, required. 
The circumstances which mandated the motion for relief include the following facts: 
1) Clausing ignored the undisputed facts of the case and intentionally interpreted the Order 
in a way that would make the Order illegal (Appellant's Brief, Sections I-II); 2) Clausing did 
not disclose her interpretation until December 1, 2005 (Rec. 394)[; 3) until March 17,2006, 
there was no reason for the Appellant to file a Motion for Review; and 4) Clausing attempted 
to collect $183,561.85 to which she was admittedly not entitled. (Rec. 157). A proper 
response, under these circumstances, was to approach the ALJ for an order invalidating 
Clausing's interpretation. The motion was filed on December 21, 2005, the day after 
Clausing attempted to collect the $183,561.75. (Rec. 163). 
Clausing argues that a Motion for Review filed with the Appeals Board of the Labor 
Commission ("Labor Commission") should have been filed within 30 days of the September 
Clausing's implies that the attempted but failed pre-December 1, 2005 phone calls provided 
notice of the dispute earlier are both unfounded and iiTelevant. Clausing has produced no evidence 
that she disclosed her demands for either $123,061.20 or $183,561.85 prior to December 1, 2005. 
Moreover, the earliest phone call alleged by Clausing occurred on November 4, 2005, already more 
than 30 days after the September 2005 Order was issued. (Rec. 394). 
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2005 Order. First, there was no need to file a Motion for Review inasmuch as the September 
2005 Order, interpreted correctly, did not award the amounts Clausing attempted to collect. 
The issue did not even arise until December 1, 2005, 68 days after the Order was issued. 
Second, even after the issue arose on December 1, 2005, there was no basis for a Motion for 
Review until the meaning of the September 2005 Order became known on March 17, 2006, 
when the ALJ issued his order on the motion for relief. 
A. The September 2005 Order Was Correct When Issued. 
Clausing falsely supposes that the Appellant was required to appeal the Order within 
30 days of September 23, 2005. Clausing, however, ignores the facts and circumstances of 
the case in reaching this supposition. Foremost among the ignored facts and circumstances 
is that there was no confusion, uncertainty, misunderstanding, or even error in the September 
23, 2005 Order. The September 23, 2005 Order was proper when it was issued. Any good 
faith interpretation of the September 23,2005 Order, necessarily recognizing the undisputed 
and acknowledged facts of the case, would not have raised any reasonable confusion as to 
the Order's meaning. 
The dispute became known only after Clausing asserted that the September 23, 2005 
Order required payment of $123, 061.20 in Temporary Total Disability ("TTD") benefits, 
which Clausing admits she was not entitled to. Clausing's present argument that Appellant 
should have been confused by the September 23, 2005 Order as soon as it was issued, would 
have required that the Appellant ignore, as explained in the Appellant's Brief, the Order as 
a whole, the undisputed facts showing no entitlement to TTD benefits, and the 
acknowledgment by Clausing that she was not entitled to TTD benefits. The Labor 
Commission erred in requiring a Motion for Review within 30 days of the September 2005 
Order under such circumstances. 
i. Clausing's interpretation was meritless in light of the undisputed 
facts of the case. 
The known and undisputed facts at the time of the September 23,2005 Order include: 
1) Clausing's settlement of all claims from March 1999 to January 14, 2002 (Appellant's 
Brief, Statement of Facts #2); 2) the judicial confirmation of Clausing's settlement of all 
claims as of October 22, 2002 (Appellant's Brief, Statement of Facts #2); 3) Clausing's 
request for TTD benefits for "only misc. dates after surgeries or for treatment prior to MMI" 
(Appellant's Brief, Statement of Facts #5); 4) Appellant's acknowledged payment of all TTD 
benefits for "misc. dates after surgeries" from March 18, 1999 to January 14, 2002, plus 
additional amounts, totaling a minimum of $5,162.66 (Appellant's Brief, page 18 (citing Rec. 
404-405)) or $6,136.66 (Brief of Appellee, Addendum #5; Rec. 216); 5) all TTD benefits 
ever owed from March 18, 1999, even including post-settlement dates, totaled a mere 
$4,451.18 (9.14 weeks x $487.00) (Appellant's Brief, page 21, Statement of Facts #6, Exhibit 
H); and 6) TTD benefits were never an issue presented to the medical panel (Appellant's 
Brief, Statement of Facts #7). 
In order for the September 23, 2005 Order to have been reasonably disputed as of 
September 23, 2005, the preceding facts would have to have been ignored, eliminated, 
disavowed, or forgotten. They were not, nor should they have been. 
ii. Appellant's interpretation was the only reasonable interpretation. 
If Clausing had interpreted the September 23, 2005 Order as a whole, and in good 
faith recognized the undisputed facts as of that date, there would never have been any 
dispute. Clausing, however, unreasonably interpreted the Order in a way that would allow 
her to obtain $183,561.85 (Rec. 157) to which she was not entitled. She therefore created 
a dispute where none reasonably existed. 
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Importantly, Clausing repeatedly admits that the September 23, 2005 Order, as 
interpreted by her, is "improper" and "embodie[s] a significant judicial error." (Brief of 
Appellee, pg. 7, 10, 36). That very fact, admitted as it is, shows that Appellant's 
interpretation was not only a reasonable interpretation, but the only reasonable interpretation. 
Any other interpretation would have made the Order contradict the factual evidence of the 
case. Appellant cannot be expected to appeal an order that, if interpreted correctly, is correct. 
The Labor Commission erred in holding otherwise. 
iii. An incorrect interpretation does not make a proper order 
improper. 
Clausing has admitted that her interpretation of the September 2005 Order made the 
Order improper. (Brief of Appellee, pg. 7, 10, 36). With such knowledge, Clausing knew 
or should have known that it was her interpretation that was incorrect, and not that the Order 
was incorrect. Clausing's argument is backwards. An incorrect interpretation should not be 
used to invalidate an order. Rather, the order, in light of the recognized facts and 
circumstances, should invalidate the incorrect interpretation. 
B. The Motion for Review Was Taken From the March 17, 2006 Order. 
In arguing that the Motion for Review was properly rejected because it was not filed 
within 30 days of the September 2005 Order, Clausing ignores the fact that the Motion for 
Review was taken from the March 17} 2006 Order. 
As explained above, no dispute regarding the meaning of the September 2005 Order 
arose until Clausing's December 1, 2005 demand. A motion for relief from Clausing's 
interpretation of that Order was then filed with the ALJ. As a practical matter, such a motion 
was required. If not filed, the meaning of the September 2005 Order would have remained 
in dispute, and the litigation would have remained perpetually unresolved. Such motions are 
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necessaiy in these situations, as is evident by the existence of Rule 52 and 59 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Such motions, it follows, are likewise permissible in the more 
flexible and informal Labor Commission proceedings. See Pilcher v. State Department of 
Social Services, 663 P.2d 450 (Utah 1983) 
The ALJ issued his order on the Appellant's motion for relief on March 17, 2006, 
which for the first time accepted Clausing's interpretation, despite its complete contradiction 
to the factual evidence. (Rec. 407-409). The March 17, 2006 Order was therefore the first 
order to make the dispute appealable under a Motion for Review. Prior to March 17, 2006, 
the meaning of the September 2005 Order could not be appealed for the simple reason that, 
from December 1, 2005 to March 17, 2006, the meaning of the September 2005 Order was 
unknown and disputed. 
Once the ALJ issued his March 17, 2006 Order, the meaning of the September 2005 
Order was no longer uncertain, the errors of the ALJ were clear, and the appropriate Motion 
for Review was filed based upon the March 17, 2006 Order. The Motion itself states that it 
seeks to review the order "entered on March 17, 2006." (Rec. 338-339). The memorandum 
in support of the Motion for Review argued that, if interpreted correctly and as a whole, the 
September 2005 Order was proper when it was issued. It also argued that no dispute 
regarding the meaning of the September 2005 Order arose until December 1, 2005. (Rec. 
340-357, 352). The Labor Commission did not even address these issues, which was error, 
and merely held that the Motion for Review was not timely. (Rec. 460-463). The Labor 
Commission's holding, however, was incorrectly based on the September 2005 Order, and 
not the March 17, 2006 Order. (Rec. 460-463). 
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i. The Motion for Review was timely filed, even if taken from the 
September 2005 Order. 
Further, even had the Motion for Review were considered to have been taken from 
the September 2005 Order, Clausing's argument again fails because under the facts present 
in this case, the 30 day period did not begin to run until March 17, 2006. As argued above, 
the meaning of the September 2005 Order first became disputed on December 1, 2005, but 
not until March 17, 2006 was the dispute resolved and the meaning of the September 2005 
Order known. 
The timeliness of an appeal is determined after consideration of a number of factors, 
including the existence of further contemplated action, amendments or modifications of prior 
orders, the finality of the order, and tolling issues. See State v. Leatherbury, 65 P.3d 1180 
(Utah 2003); Nielson v. Gurley. 888 P.2d 130 (Utah App. 1994). It is clear that the 
timeliness of an appeal is not based exclusively on an order date. In Gurley, the court 
specifically re-iterated the longstanding law that a subsequent order modifying or amending 
a judgment in a material way tolls the appeal time. Gurley, at 132. The March 17, 2006 
Order modified or amended the September 2005 Order in a material way by granting 
$183,561.20 to Clausing, which the September 2005 Order, reasonably interpreted in light 
of the undisputed and acknowledged facts of the case, did not do. Prior to March 17, 2006, 
the meaning of the September 2005 Order was unlaiown. The March 17, 2006 materially 
changed the situation. 
Once the March 17, 2006 Order was issued, the Motion for Review was filed. The 
Motion for Review properly presented facts and circumstances before the Labor Commission 
to show that the Motion for Review was timely. The Labor Commission, however, not only 
failed, but actually refused to consider the facts and circumstances relevant to timeliness. 
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Instead, it limited its review specifically to whether a Rule 60(b) motion may be filed in 
administrative proceedings. (Rec. 461). This was error. The Labor Commission had the 
obligation to determine whether the Motion for Review was timely, and in doing so, it was 
obligated to consider all factors relevant to timeliness, and not merely an order date. 
It is fundamental that a party is entitled to appeal rights. (Utah Constitution Article 
VIII, §5). As stated above, the Labor Commission failed to address any of the factors 
necessary to determining timeliness. The Labor Commission ignored and denied the 
Appellant's appeal rights. The Motion for Review did not rise or fall on whether a "Rule 
60(b)" motion may be filed in administrative proceedings. (Rec. 461). Rather, it rose or fell 
based on the arguments contained in the Motion for Review - its content. "[T]he right to an 
appeal is a valuable and constitutional right and ought not to be denied except where it is 
clear the right has been lost or abandoned." Gurley, at 132. The Labor Commission erred in 
not addressing the content of the Motion for Review, including the content as to timeliness. 
By not addressing the content of the Motion for Review, including the factors relevant to 
timeliness, the Labor Commission erred. 
For example, if an appellee claims that appeal time began miming from an order dated 
January 1, but an appellant asserts that the appeal time did not begin running until a 
subsequent order on March 1, the court must consider not only the dates of the orders, but 
all of the other relevant facts to determine when the appeal time began to run. The Labor 
Commission did not consider anything other than the September 2005 date. It did not 
address the fact that no dispute arose until December 1,2005. It did not address whether the 
Appellant's pre-December 1, 2005 interpretation was reasonable. It did not even address 
whether Clausing's pre-December 2005 inteipretation was reasonable. It did not address the 
fact that the meaning of the September 2005 Order did not become known until March 17, 
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2006. Rather, the Labor Commission held, as a matter of law exclusive of all other facts, that 
the appeal time began running in September 2005. This was error. 
Presently, on appeal, the timeliness of the Motion for Review must be reviewed under 
a correctness standard. See Kennecott Corp., v. State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 1099 (Utah 
1991). 
C. The Principles of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Are Applicable in 
Administrative Proceedings. 
Clausing argues, and the Labor Commission incorrectly held, that Appellant's motion 
for relief from Clausing's interpretation of the September 2005 Order was not permitted 
under Utah law. Clausing has produced no law or rule to support the assertion. Under Utah 
law, including administrative law, such motions are permitted. 
Clausing purports to support her argument by noting that the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act ("UAPA") does not specifically "require" the use of the rules or principles 
in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or "subject" administrative proceedings to the URCP. 
(Brief of Appellee, pg 24). Such statements are irrelevant. Whether the UAPA specifically 
"requires" compliance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is irrelevant to whether the 
rules or principles set forth in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable to 
administrative proceedings. In fact, Utah administrative case law clearly shows that the 
principles and rules set forth in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure should be liberally applied 
in administrative proceedings. The Labor Commission erred in holding otherwise.2 
2Contrary to Clausing's assertion, Appellant never asserted that URCP Rule 60(b) must be 
incorporated into the UAPA. (Brief of Appellee, Point IB, pg. 26, 41-42). Clausing's accompanying 
argument and citation to Mini Spas Inc., v. Ind. Comm'n, 733 P.2d 130 (Utah 1987) and Airkem 
Intermountain v. Parker, 513 P.2d 429 (Utah 1973) are consequently irrelevant. 
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The applicability of the principles and rules of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in 
administrative proceedings is evidenced not only by the cases cited in the Appellant's Brief, 
but also by the very case cited by Clausing's Appellee's Brief. Clausing selectively quotes 
from Pilcher v. State Department of Social Services, 663 P.2d 450 (Utah 1983). Fully 
quoted, however, the Pilcher case explains that it is the restrictions of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure that do not apply in administrative proceedings. 
While the mode of procedure before administrative bodies may conform to the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the rules governing civil procedure in the trial 
courts are not necessarily applicable to administrative proceedings. [Citations 
omitted]. Thus, administrative proceedings are not subject to the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure unless the governing statute or regulations so provide. 
Administrative proceedings are usually conducted with greater flexibility and 
informality than judicial proceedings. [Citation Omitted]. Rigid adherence to 
judicial procedures in administrative proceedings is generally inappropriate 
because it ignores basic differences between judicial and administrative 
procedures. [Citation Omitted]. 
(Emphasis added). The reason the Rules of Civil Procedure are not specifically required by 
the UAPA is to allow administrative proceedings "greater flexibility and informality." It is 
not to restrict the use of the principles set forth in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This 
is made clear in another case cited by Clausing, State Tax Comm'n v. Iverson, 782 P.2d 519, 
527-528 (Utah 1989). In that case, Iverson argued that because the subpoena issued to him 
m an administrative proceeding did not strictly comply with the provisions of Rule 45(d)(2) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the subpoena was invalid. Recognizing that the reason 
compliance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is not mandated in administrative 
proceedings is to allow "greater flexibility and informality," the court simply held that 
Iverson had not been prejudiced, and rejected Iverson's technical argument. Id. 
The case law cited by Clausing shows nothing more than that the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure are not to be used as a tool to restrict the presentation of arguments and flexibility 
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in administrative proceedings. Clausing provides no case law precluding the use of the rules 
and principles of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, especially when such use is consistent 
with the administrative puiposes of "greater flexibility and informality."3 In fact, the 
opposite is true. Utah case law shows that courts have consistently applied such rules and 
principles when it does not restrict administrative flexibility. See Paulsen v. The Industrial 
Commission, 770 P.2d 125 (Utah 1989); Bowen Trucking v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 559 P.2d 
954, 956 (Utah 1977). 
In direct contradiction to Clausing's argument, Utah courts state that "[i]nherent in 
the power to make an administrative decision is the authority to reconsider a decision. 
[Citations omitted]. . . The absence of specific authority in the governing statutes is not 
determinative. Every tribunal has some power to correct its own mistakes."Career Serv. 
Review Bd. v. Utah Dep't of Corrections, 942 P.2d 933, 946 (Utah 1997)(emphasis added). 
The Labor Commission erred in holding otherwise. 
II. CLAUSING'S ARGUMENT IS DEFEATED BY HER CONCESSIONS. 
As part of her main argument, Clausing concedes that under the "continuing 
jurisdiction" provisions of the Workers Compensation Act, the agency has the authority to 
modify its previous orders on the basis of 1) "subsequently discovered facts," 2) "evidence 
of some significant change or new development," or 3) "proof of the previous award's 
inadequacy." (Appelee's Brief, pg. 29, fn. 66). Based upon the facts present in this case, 
Clausing thereby concedes that the Labor Commission did indeed have the authority to 
3The UAPA states only that the administrative rules "are not required to conform to 
common law orstatutoiy rules of evidence or other technical rules of procedure" and that the 
commission is "not bound . . . by any technical or formal rules of procedure." UCA 34A-1-
304(l)(b); 34A-2-801(l) (Emphasis added). Such language does not preclude the Appellant's 
motion for relief, as a matter of law, as held by the Labor Commission. 
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correct the ALJ's September 2005 or March 2006 Orders, and consequently, that it erred in 
determining otherwise. 
A. The Discovery of a Dispute Regarding the Meaning of the September 2005 
Order Constitutes a "Subsequently Discovered Fact." 
The Motion for Review showed that Appellant did not become aware of any dispute 
regarding the meaning of the September 2005 Order until December 1,2005. The existence 
of a dispute regarding the meaning of the September 2005 Order became known on 
December 1, 2005, and therefore the arising of the dispute qualifies as a "subsequently 
discovered fact," going to the very merits of the litigation. By conceding that the Labor 
Commission has the authority to modify previous orders in such circumstances, Clausing 
necessarily concedes that the Labor Commission had the authority to modify the previous 
September 2005 Order. The Labor Commission erred in holding that it had no authority to 
modify the September 2005 Order based upon its continuing jurisdiction. 
B. The Discovery of a Dispute and the Entry of the March 17, 2006 Order 
Both Consitute a "Significant Change or Development." 
It was likewise clear to the Labor Commission that the meaning of the September 
2005 Order was not made clear until March 17, 2006. The December 1, 2005 discovery of 
a dispute, and the March 17,2006 resolution of the December 1,2005 dispute both constitute 
"evidence of some significant change or new development." These developments changed 
the entire litigation. Clausing concedes, therefore, that the Labor Commission had the 
authority to modify the previous September 2005 and March 17, 2006 Orders. The Labor 
Commission erred by refusing to recognize its continuing jurisdiction and ability to correct 
the ALJ's mistakes. 
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C. There Is Not Only Abundant "Proof," but Also Admissions of the 
"Previous Award's Inadequacy." 
Most importantly, even if no "subsequently discovered facts" had been found, and 
even if no "significant change" had taken place, the fact remains undisputed thaf'proof of the 
previous award's inadequacy" was provided to the Labor Commission. The Labor 
Commission recognized the ALJ's errors, but incorrectly held that it could do nothing to 
correct the errors.4 (Rec. 462). Clausing's Appellee's Brief likewise admits that the Labor 
Commission recognized the error. (Brief of Appellee, pg. 39). Clausing, therefore, 
consequently admits that the Labor Commission indeed had the authority to correct the 
"previous award's inadequacy." (Appelee's Brief, pg. 29, fn. 66). Clausing's Appellee's 
Brief openly concedes that the Labor Commission erred in detemiining it had no authority 
to do so. 
D. The Admitted Existence of a "Significant Judicial Error" Authorized the 
Labor Commission to Reverse the ALJ. The Labor Commission Erred in 
Holding Otherwise. 
The authority to correct mistakes under the continuing jurisdiction statute is further 
confirmed by the Paulsen v. Indus. Comm'n, 770 P.2d 125 (Utah 1989) previously cited in 
Appellant's Brief and quoted at length by Clausing in her Brief. Under Paulsen, the 
continuing jurisdiction statute "gives the Commission broad authority to make substantive 
changes in its orders when substantial changes in the circumstances have occurred." id,, at 
130. The erred in failing to do so. 
4The Labor Commission acknowledged the ALJ's errors stating that the "Appeals Board is 
aware that [the ALJ's] decision may have awarded excessive temporary total disability 
compensation to Ms. Clausing," but it still refused to correct them. (Rec. 462) 
-1?-
The Paulsen court specifically expanded the right to correct errors beyond mere 
"clerical errors" to include "substantive changes." The Paulsen court specifically includes 
"judicial errors" as a "substantive change." Id. Clausing admits, throughout her Brief that 
the September 2005 Order as "embod[ying] a significant judicial error." (Brief of Appellee, 
pg. 7, 10, 36). By conceding the principles in Paulsen and at the same time asserting the 
existence of a "significant judicial error" in the September 2005 Order, Clausing defeats her 
own argument and position. The very facts and case law cited by Clausing show the Labor 
Commission's error in determining it had no authority to correct the error, as well as its error 
in not doing so. 
III. THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AS PRESENTED BY APPELLANT ARE 
PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT AND SHOULD NOT BE LIMITED. 
In her Brief, Clausing argues for the first time that the only issue before the Appeals 
Court is the "propriety of the denial of that [Rule 60(b)] motion." (Brief of Appellee, pg. 33). 
Clausing's arguments ignore the fact that the Motion for Review was timely filed after the 
March 17, 2006 Order and preserved all of the issues for appeal, including the merits of the 
case. Clausing also ignores the content of the motion for relief and the basis for appeal in 
an effort to limit the issues on appeal. 
A. The Motion for Review Properly Preserved the Issues on Appeal. 
Clausing's argument fails to recognize that the meaning of the September 2005 Order 
did not become known until March 17, 2006. Clausing fails to recognize that the Appellant 
thereafter timely filed a Motion for Review challenging the merits of the case decided by that 
March 17, 2006 Order. The fact that the Labor Commission did not consider the merits of 
the Motion for Review does not limit the issues on appeal. That is, of course, a basis for the 
appeal. The Labor Commission erred in not considering the merits of the case when it denied 
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the Motion for Review, properly and timely taken from the March 17, 2006 Order. The 
merits of the case were properly before the Labor Commission on the Motion for Review, 
and are properly before the Appeals Court now. 
B. The Motion for Relief Should Be Considered According to its Content, 
Not its Title. 
Under Utah law, motion for relief should be judged by its content, and not by its title. 
See Howard v. Howard, 356 P.2d 275 (Utah 1960). In Armstrong Rubber v. Bastian, 657 
P.2d 1346, 1348 (Utah 1983) the court explained "[i]f the nature of the motion can be 
ascertained from the substance of the instrument, we have heretofore held that an improper 
caption is not fatal to that motion." The motion for relief argued that the September 2005 
Order, properly interpreted, was clear. It argued that all claims had been settled as of 
October 2002. (Rec. 170). It argued further that it learned of Clausing5s interpretation for 
the first time on December 1, 2005. (Rec. 170-171). It is clear that the motion for relief 
requested relief from Clausing's interpretation, and for an eventual order to determine if any 
TTD benefits were owed. (Rec. 172-173). Such a motion, under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, would be properly considered under either Rule 60, Rule 52, and/or Rule 59. 
Under the more flexible and infomial administrative procedures, such a motion is likewise 
permissible, regardless of its title. Considering the circumstances, where the meaning of the 
September 2005 Order was in dispute, the motion was absolutely necessary. Without such 
a motion, the meaning of the September 2005 Order would have remained perpetually in 
dispute. There is nothing in the administrative rules, or the more restrictive Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, that would make such a motion inappropriate. 
The motion for relief was not, as characterized by Clausing, a "substitute for a timely 
appeal." (Brief of Appellee, pg. 33). As explained above, when the motion for relief was 
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filed, no appeal was or should have been expected. There was no appealable issue until 
March 17, 2006. Further, the Appellant cannot be expected to appeal the meaning of an 
order when the Appellant's interpretation is the only reasonable interpretation, and the only 
interpretation that complies with the acknowledged facts of the case. 
The motion for relief properly raised the issues that are on appeal today. Those issues 
were also properly and timely presented in the later Motion for Review after the March 17, 
2006 Order. These issues are now properly before the Appeals Court. This appeal, therefore, 
is not limited to the mere propriety of the motion for relief under Rule 60(b). 
C. Even If the Issues on Appeal Were Limited, the Labor Commission 
Should Still Be Reversed. 
Even if the Labor Commission were merely to consider the propriety of the motion 
for relief under Rule 60(b), the Labor Commission's order should still be reversed. 
i. The Labor Commission erred in not addressing, much less finding 
excusable neglect. 
Clausing argues, incorrectly, that a motion for review must have been filed within 30 
days of September 2005. First, because the meaning of the September 2005 Order was not 
in dispute until December 1, 2005. Second, because the content of the motion makes the 30 
day time limit inapplicable. 
As of December 1,2005, the meaning of the September 2005 Order became unknown 
and remained in limbo. In these circumstances, the Appellant acted as any "reasonably 
prudent person [would act] under the same circumstances" when it filed the motion for relief 
with the ALL Interstate Excavating v. Agla Dev. Corp., 611 P.2d 369, 372 (Utah 1980). 
Appellant's failure to file a Motion for Review within 30 days of the September 2005 Order 
is, under such circumstances, justifiably excused. It is an abuse of discretion to require a 
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party to appeal an issue within 30 days of September 2005, when the appealable issue did not 
even arise until December 1,2005 and did not become appealable until March 17,2006. The 
ALJ and Labor Commission erred in holding as they did.5 
Furthermore, even under the more restrictive principles of Rule 60(b)(1), Appellant 
would be allowed 3 months to file its "excusable neglect" motion, either in the form of a 
motion for relief or motion for review, from either the September 2005 Order or the March 
17, 2006 Order. In Lund v. Brown, 11 P.3d 277 (Utah 2000), the court held that a party's 
good faith, legitimate reliance on the protection of a bankruptcy stay provision constituted 
a justification under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) for a failure to reply to the counterclaim. Similarly, 
the Appellant's good faith reliance on its reasonable interpretation, in fact the only 
reasonable interpretation, provides similar justification for both its motion for relief and 
Motion for Review. The ALJ and Labor Commission erred in failing to so find. 
ii. The Labor Commission erred in not finding that the TTD claims 
had been satisfied. 
The content of Appellant's motion for relief to the ALJ and Motion for Review can 
also be justified under the principles of Rule 60(b)(5) in that the TTD judgment rendered has 
already been satisfied. As explained in the Appellant's Brief, Clausing judicially settled all 
her claims as of October 22, 2002. (Rec. 364-368, 371). Importantly, this fact is never 
disputed, or even addressed by Clausing. 
5Contrary to Clausing's argument, the Labor Commission did not "interpret" the 
September 2005 Order when it ruled on the Motion for Review. (Brief of Appellee, pg. 36, 
39)(emphasis added). The Labor Commission did not even address the merits of the Motion 
for Review relating to interpretation. Rather, it held essentially as a matter of law, that the 
September 2005 Order could not be reviewed because more than 30 days had passed since 
it was signed. This is error. 
_i£_ 
All TTD benefits owed from the date of the accident, March 1999, amounting to 9.14 
weeks (64 days), had been paid to Clausing prior to the September 2005 Order. The 
September 2005 Order, as interpreted by Clausing, not only awarded these amounts once 
again, but it ordered additional TTD payments for 263.57 weeks (1,845 days) during which 
Clausing was not temporarily totally disabled. (Appellant's Brief, pg. 20-21). 
These facts relating to the October 2002 settlement are contained in both the motion 
for relief and the Motion for Review (Rec. 170, 342,364-368). The facts regarding the TTD 
were likewise presented. (Rec. 194-195, 383-384). The facts regarding the payment of TTD 
amounts owed were also presented. (Rec. 171-172, 342, 351). The facts presented to both 
the ALJ and the Labor Commission show that all TTD amounts owed, were previously paid. 
Even under the more restrictive Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically Rule 60(b)(5), 
the motion for relief and Motion for Review were appropriate. The Labor Commission erred 
in not addressing this issue. It also erred in not reversing the ALJ on this basis. 
iii. The Labor Commission erred in not reversing the ALJ for other 
reasons justifying relief. 
The content of the motion for relief and Motion for Review also provides justification 
for reversal under the principles of Rule 60(b)(6). Even under the more restrictive Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, the filing of such a motion is not limited by any specific deadline, but 
rather, may be filed within a "reasonable time." See Laub v. South Central Utah Tel. Ass'n., 
657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982). The reasons justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6) have been set 
forth in detail in the Appellant's Brief and this Reply. These arguments were likewise raised 
in the motion for relief and the Motion for Review, including the fact that Appellant's 
inteipretation of the September 2005 Order was reasonable considering the facts and 
circumstances. Consequently, no action was taken until after December 1, 2005 when 
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Clausing made the demand for amounts she was not entitled to. The Labor Commission's 
decision, and Clausing's present argument, both based upon the failure to file within 30 days 
of September 2005 is groundless. 
Of course, there are numerous additional facts, foremost among them is Clausing's 
admission that she is not entitled to any of the TTD she now demands, which likewise justify 
relief 
iv. The Labor Commission erred in not addressing the content of the 
Motion for Review. 
Contrary to Clausing's present arguments, the content of the motion for relief and the 
Motion for Review justify both motions under the principles explained above, as well as the 
principles in Rule 52 and Rule 59. The ALJ's Order, as admitted by Clausing, contains a 
significant error, if inteipreted as Clausing argues. It awards $183,561.85 for TTD, none of 
which Clausing is entitled to. 
Once the Appellant learned of the disputed interpretation, a motion for relief became 
justified under the principles of Rules 52 and 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. There 
is certainly nothing under Utah law or the administrative rules precluding such motions from 
being filed. Nor is there any reason why such motions would be allowed under the more 
formal Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, but not under the more flexible and informal 
administrative procedures. 
Further, once the ALJ issued its March 17, 2006 Order, which for the first time 
clarified the meaning of the September 2005 Order, the principles encompassed by Rules 52 
and 59 again became applicable. Therefore, even had it not been completely proper under 
the administrative rules, the Motion for Review would nonetheless be appropriate under the 
principles of Rules 52 and 59. However, as explained above, the Labor Commission 
1 Q 
completely ignored the content of the Motion for Review, and utterly failed to address the 
content of the Motion for Review. Instead, it determined essentially as a matter of law, that 
any and all motions on this matter must have been filed within 30 days of the September 
2005 Order, regardless of the facts and circumstances of the case. This was error. 
IV. CLAUSING'S ADMISSION OF ADDITIONAL ERROR IN THE ORDER 
FURTHER JUSTIFIES REVERSAL OF THE LABOR COMMISSION. 
Importantly, Clausing's argument does not deny that the September 2005 order 
improperly ordered TTD compensation of $183,561.85. Instead, Clausing argues that this 
mistake should simply be ignored because she claims she should have been awarded 
$123,061.20 as Temporary Partial Disability compensation. Needless to say, the Labor 
Commission's error awarding TTD is not invalidated simply because Clausing claims a 
second separate Temporary Partial Disability partially makes up for the TTD mistake. 
The fact remains, and is admitted by Clausing, that no TTD benefits should have been 
awarded. That simple fact justifies reversal. 
The existence of further mistakes claimed by Clausing regarding Temporary Partial 
Disability does not make the TTD error harmless, especially when the claimed Temporary 
Partial Disability errors have never been shown. Further, even if Clausing's claim for 
Temporary Partial Disability compensation were true, which is disputed, it still only offsets 
a portion of the amount improperly awarded as TTD. 
Far from justifying the Labor Commission's errors, the further errors claimed by 
Clausing simply serve as additional reasons the Labor Commission should be reversed. 
A. Clausing Is Not Entitled to Either TTD or Temporary Partial Disability. 
Clausing's claim to Temporary Partial Disability of $123,061.20 is not supported by 
the evidence. The overwhelming bulk of the $123,061.20 claimed by Clausing purportedly 
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arose, as admitted by Clausing, before the January 2002 settlement and October 22, 2002 
Order. (Rec. 383-384). Clausmg waived all claims to such amounts when she voluntarily 
entered the settlement agreement while represented by counsel. (Rec. 364-369). The 
remaining post-settlement disability amounts claimed by Clausing are not compensable, 
inasmuch as they do not arise out of any industrial accident. Clausing was cleared to work, 
and in fact had been working full time as of May 31,2002. (Rec. 383). She thereafter chose 
not to work. 
More importantly, neither the September, 2005 Order, nor the March 17, 2006 Order 
awarded Clausing any Temporary Partial Disability. Clausing is not entitled to such an award 
now. 
B. Clausing's Claims to Temporary Partial Disability Compensation Has 
Been Waived. 
Additionally, even if Clausing were owed Temporary Partial Disability, the fact 
remains that Clausing admits to knowing of the mistake as of September 23, 2005 when the 
Order was issued. By her own admission and under her own arguments, Clausing was 
allowed only 30 days to appeal any mistake. She not only failed to appeal the September 
2005 Order, she consciously chose not to do so. Clausing's knowledge of the mistake and 
decision not to appeal the mistake is set forth in affidavit form (Rec. 395-396), as well as 
letter form. (Rec. 214). Clausing's Brief of Appellee confirms that she not only knew of the 
claimed Temporary Partial Disability mistake, but that she purposefully waived her right to 
appeal Temporary Partial Disability issue because, under her interpretation of the September 
2005 Order, unless Appellant promptly paid the amount demanded, Clausing could obtain 
even more money as Temporary Total Disability compensation. (Brief of Appellee, 
Statement of Facts 10, 13; Rec. 394-395, pars. 7-11). 
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V. THE APPELLANT DID NOT FAIL TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE. 
Clausing asserts that Appellant has failed to marshal the evidence. Clausing fails, 
however, to describe the evidence which Appellant purportedly failed to marshal. 
Additionally, Clausing has presented no evidence to show her entitlement to $183,561.85 in 
TTD. Quite to the contrary, Clausing has admitted that she is not entitled to $183,561.85 in 
TTD. (Brief of Appellee, Statement of Facts 10, 13). Therefore, there is no fault in failing 
to present evidence "in support of the trial court's findings" awarding TTD, when it is 
undisputed that no such evidence exists. 
CONCLUSION 
Clausing fails to recognize several facts. The dispute regarding the meaning of the 
September 2005 Order did not arise until December 1, 2005. Prior to that time, Appellant's 
interpretation of the September 2005 Order was the only reasonable interpretation. In 
contrast, Clausing's interpretation admittedly made the order improper and contrary to the 
evidence. Appellant cannot be required to appeal an order that when properly interpreted, 
should not be appealed. 
Additionally, the meaning of the September 2005 Order was unknown from December 
1, 2005 until March 17, 2006. Only at that point did the matter become appealable under a 
Motion for Review. The Motion for Review was thereafter filed in a timely manner. The 
Labor Commission failed to recognize that the Motion for Review was taken from the March 
17, 2006, failed to address the content of the Motion for Review, and thereby erred. 
Clausing's argument that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are not "required" in 
administrative proceedings is irrelevant. Of relevancy, however, is the fact that under Utah 
law, administrative proceedings are to be more flexible and informal, and therefore, they are 
not bound by the restrictions in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Appellant's use of the 
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principles of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are consistent with the flexible and informal 
intent of administrative proceedings. 
Further, contrary to Clausing's argument, "[i]nherent in the power to make an 
administrative decision is the authority to reconsider a decision. [Citations omitted]. . . The 
absence of specific authority in the governing statutes is not determinative. Every tribunal 
has some power to correct its own mistakes."Career Serv. Review Bd. v. Utah Dep't of 
Corrections. 942 P.2d 933, 946 (Utah 1997)(emphasis added). 
Clausing also concedes that under the ''continuing jurisdiction" provisions of the 
Workers Compensation Act, "subsequently discovered facts," "evidence of some significant 
change or new development," and "proof of the previous award's inadequacy" would each 
be sufficient to grant the Labor Commission the authority to correct the acknowledged ALJ 
mistake. By conceding such in the face of 1) the subsequently discovered fact that the 
meaning of the September 2005 Order was in dispute; 2) the significant change or new 
development created both by the dispute and the March 17, 2006 Order; and 3) the admitted 
fact of the September 2005 Order's inadequacy, Clausing concedes that the Labor 
Commission did, in fact, have the authority to grant the relief requested, and erred in 
determining otherwise. 
The arguments contained in Appellant's motion for relief and Motion for Review were 
justified under the principles of Rules 52, 59 and 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
They were likewise appropriate under the more flexible and informal administrative 
proceedings. The issues contained therein were properly and timely presented, and are now 
properly before the Appeals Court. 
The meaning of the ALJ's September 2005 Order was unknown from December 1, 
2005 to March 17, 2006, and when it became known it contained, as admitted by Clausing, 
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a significant judicial error. It awarded $183,561.85 in TTD, absolutely none of which 
Clausing was entitled to. Under such circumstances, the Labor Commission erred in not 
correcting the mistake or error. 
Respectfully submitted this \u day of May, 2007. 
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